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BOOK REVIEWS
S'l'ANDAIUJS ol" AM!tRICAN L£GISLATioN. An Estimate of Restrictive and Constructive Factors. By Ernst Freund, Professor of Jurisprudence
in the University of Chicago. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1917; pp. xx 327.
Dr. Freund's book was read by the reviewer in the summer of 1917, but
a combination of circumstances, greatly regretted by him, has prevented the
completion and publishing of the review then partially prepared. The justification for printing it now lies in the excellence of Dr. Freund's work and .
in the vital importance of careful study by American lawyers of the too
long neglected field of legislation as, with the War, apparently ended, the
Nation enters upon a period of political and social reconstruction, which
seems· destined to be epochal. \Vith the organized forces of the titanic
struggle halted, and its tumult suddenly stilled, we emerge swiftly into a
period of seeming calm, but portentous with the suggestion which we now
only vaguely sense and cannot yet analyze, that the mighty forces released
in the world's convulsion cannot be returned within their old confines. It
is a time that calls for constructive statesmanship of a high order; many
complex and radical changes will undoubtedly be made, changes for the making of which the gradual processes of the courts, and precedents and stare
decisis were never designed and for which they are totally inadequate. The
ship of state can be kept on a true course, as it emerges from the international storm, only by the resort to legislation, organic or fundamental and
ordinary, unless indeed the hyenas of soeiety, aided by hair-brained and egotistical visionaries are to subject us to the direct and destructive methods of
Bolshevism. At any rate it would seem that our courts as at present organized, hampered by tradition and restricted and in important respects made
ineffectual by archaic and blundering constitutional and legislative checks
and restrictions in many states will be wholly unequal to serve as the agents
of the inevitable transition,* and that the volume of our legislation already
overwhelming will be enormously augmented.
Dr. Freund says of his book in the preface: "Its purpose is to suggest
the possibility of supplementing the established doctrine of constitutional
law which enforces legislative norms through e:i; post facto R:iwmw and negation by a system of positive principles that should guide and control the making of statutes, and give a more definite meaning and content to the concept of due process of law." The introduction differentiates between principle and policy in legislation, confusion concerning which has undoubtedly
produced many of the unfortunate court decisions which had much to do
with the demand for the "recall of decisions" a few years ago. Thus as
Dr. Freund says (p. 2) : "It was rather a fundamental policy of distributive
*For an illuminating discussion of Courts and Legislation see Pound, 7
Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 361.
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justice which the New York Court saW" (in the regrettable case of Ives v •. _
So11th Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271) "fixed upon the state by the guiraniy
of due process-fundamental, but after all only a policy, likely to be chiinged · · -by the process of economic and social thought." But what have courts to
do with policy? Dr. Freund's answer appears later.
The first five chapters are largely historical, a rapid but very penetrating
examination of the changes of policy in regard to such juristic conceptions
as the right of personality, freedom of thought, repression of unthrift, etc.
The common law as a system of public policy is shown to be inadequate and
the "tasks and hazards of legislation" are indicated, and constitutional limitations considered. Concerning the latter Dr. Frenil:d concludes:
''Upon a larger view, then, of our constitutional history we are -·
impressed with the fact that in assigning a controlling function to
the courts we have after all not altered the universal character of
constitutional issues: in America as well as in other countries they
are, in the main, issues of power and policy: Compared with these
issues the question of the conformity of legislation to financial principles of law has engaged the attention of the courts only to a relatively slight extent, and their decisions offer little in the way of
enlightening discussion of canons of justice applicable to legisla.
.
tion."
and this he thinks is what·was to have bten expected:
"But above all it is necessary to realize, not only that constitutional law as represented by judicial decisions does not furnish us
with a body of principles of legislation, but that it does not even
indicate fully and clearly the nature and scope of these principles.

ln Chapter VI, "The Meaning of Principle in Legislation" are more completely distinguished:
"while principle in common law simply stands for logic, reason,
and established policy, its meaning in legislation is far more complex. We can hardly say more to begin with than that it means a
settled point of view, and any closer analysis requires careful differentiation.
"At the opposite ends of the various classes of considerations
that move the legislator we shonld place constitutional requirement
and policy. The constitutional rnle must be obeyed no matter what
opinion may be entertained of its wisdom, and is thus withdrawn
from argument except for the purpose of interpretation."
"Policy, on the other hand. represents the freedom of legislative
discretion. No matter what array of facts and arguments we may
bring to bear upon certain problems, we must recognize that in the
present state of human thought and Imowledge their determination
is controlled by considerations which lie beyond the forum of compelling reason, and depends upon fundamental differences in bliits
and ideals."
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And as to the social sciences in their relation to legislation he says:
"The bulk of modern legislation deals with social, economic, or
political problems. These problems are not amenable to .the same
methods of treatment as the problems of physical science,· and few
of the conclusions offered in the name of the social sciences can
claim finality or acceptance as absolute truths. Those who insist
that the legislature is bound to defer to experts do well to remember that, of the great social measures of the nineteenth century,
the factory acts were carried against the protests of economists,
while the public-h~alth laws were largely based on theories of the
spread of disease which are now rejected."
"Nevertheless, a science of legislation desirous of establishing
a status of its own would treat the data of the social sciences as
lying outside of its own sphere and consider thaf its task begins
only when their conclusions have been reached and formulated."
The final chapter is devoted to constructive suggestions, among which are
the creation of special commissions for the drafting- of bills, increasing the
powers of administrative commissions, drafting bureaus, and the right of
the executive to introduce bills and to participate in the debates
The treatment throughout is suggestive rather than exhaustive, but from
cover to cover it is the work of a scholar and characterized by wide knowledge, clear, objective and scientific analysis.
Unquestionably American lawyers and law schools have given too little attention to the study of legislation. There is great promise in such work as
Dr. Freund is doing, and it is to be hoped that he will publish further studies
of this kind.

HENRY M. BATES.
THE ARMY AND THE LAW, by Garrard Glenn, of the New York Bar, Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University. New York: Columbia University Press, 1918: pp. I, l':Jl.
The purpose of this book is to define "the relation of the common law
to the army,"-not including the rules governing the internal affairs of the
army, nor the international laws of war, except incidentally, but "with the
army only in its relation to the common law which governs the general public, and with the soldier only insofar as his activities are, in point of law,
of interest to non-military persons."
Mr. Glenn does this under the following heads: Introductory; 'fhe Constitution of the Army; :Military Law and Military Courts; '!'he Army's Right
of Self-Regulation: The Army in Its Relation with the Enemy; Military Occupation in Matters of Government; Military Occupation in Matters of Property; Relation of Soldier to Civilian in Time of Peace; Relation of Soldier
to Civilian in Time of War; and Martial Law.
It is a real pleasure to meet such a book as this at this time. Nothing
could be more timely. The book should be read and studied by civilians and

.·
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soldiers aiike; 'and lawyers, whose ideas upon these matters are'1Jlore or less
hazy certainly will ~d help ana plea5ure in its penisal. While perhaps, one
would take issue with the author upon some pmtters and conclusimµ;. or·
·would not quite agree with his statement of the basis of the decision of some
cases referred ,to,-as, for instance, Ex parte King, 246 (not 247) Fed. 868
(p. 59-)-yet on the whole this reviewer does not lmow where. so much
meaty substance, so well arranged, so clearly put, in so small a space, on
the topics treated, can be found as in this book. It and Part I of BOTY AND
MORGAN'S WARS: !'rs CONDUCT AND LJ;GAI. ~ULTS, should be read together.
.
H. L. W.n.cus.

